SMS Software for US Regional Airlines (Part 121)
01Part 5 and Part 121 since 2015
A regional airline is not new to this. The original FAA rule, Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations Certificate Holders, was published on January 8, 2015 and took effect on March 9, 2015. It created 14 CFR Part 5 and gave every Part 121 carrier two dates: an implementation plan to the FAA by September 9, 2015, and an SMS in place by March 9, 2018. A regional got the same four components as the carrier whose brand it flies under: Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion.
The second date that matters is recent. The 2024 final rule was published on April 26, 2024 and took effect on May 28, 2024. It is best known for bringing Part 135 and air tour operators into Part 5, but it also amended the part for carriers already inside it. Under 14 CFR 5.7(a), a Part 121 carrier that held an FAA-accepted SMS on the effective date had to revise that SMS to the amended part no later than May 28, 2025.
Three of the amendments land squarely on a regional:
- A code of ethics. The safety policy must now include a code of ethics that applies to all employees, including management personnel and officers, and that clarifies that safety is the organization's highest priority (5.21(a)(7)).
- Hazard notification to interfacing persons. A carrier that identifies a hazard in its operating environment must notify any interfacing person who, to the best of its knowledge, could address the hazard or mitigate the risk (5.57). The rule describes interfacing persons as those who contribute to the safety of the carrier's aviation-related products and services.
- A record of each notification. Records of communications made under 5.57 are retained for a minimum of 24 consecutive calendar months (5.97(d)). Safety assurance records are retained for a minimum of 5 years (5.97(b)).
So the buying question in 2026 is not how to build an SMS. It is whether the system you already run can evidence the amended rule, and whether it still fits an airline that has changed shape since 2018.
02The shape of a regional carrier
Part 5 reads the same for every Part 121 certificate. The operation behind the certificate does not. Four things make a regional different from the mainline it feeds, and from the Part 135 charter below it.
- You are overseen and you oversee. A regional usually flies under a codeshare or capacity agreement, so a larger partner asks it for safety evidence. At the same time it contracts ground handling, maintenance and training to others. Those are the interfaces Part 5 asks a system analysis to consider (5.53(b)(5)), and the likely recipients of a 5.57 notification. Read the rule against your own agreements to decide who qualifies.
- Mixed fleets, many stations. Two or three aircraft types, some of them inherited from a partner, flown into small stations with contract staff. A hazard at one outstation and a trend on one type have to be visible as such, not averaged away in a single airline figure.
- Voluntary programs already running. Much of the safety data a regional owns arrives through programs it joined voluntarily, with their own confidentiality rules. The next section covers them.
- A thin safety department. The Director of Safety is a required full-time Part 121 management position (14 CFR 119.65), but the team behind that person is often a handful of people who also run the voluntary programs, the investigations and the board packs. Every hour spent rebuilding a chain of evidence by hand is an hour not spent on risk.
Software earns its place where those four meet: one small team, several data sources with different privacy rules, and two audiences (the FAA and a partner airline) who both sample records and expect the trail to hold.
03ASAP and FOQA beside the SMS
Two voluntary FAA programs supply much of what a regional knows about its own operation. Neither is part of Part 5, and both come with conditions that software has to respect.
An Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) is entered into voluntarily through a memorandum of understanding signed by the FAA, the certificate holder and, where applicable, the employee labor organization. Reports are reviewed by an Event Review Committee made up of a representative from each party to the memorandum, which works by consensus. The current guidance is Advisory Circular 120-66C, dated March 31, 2020.
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) is a voluntary program for the routine analysis of recorded flight data, described in Advisory Circular 120-82. Under 14 CFR 13.401, the FAA does not use FOQA data from a program with an FAA-approved implementation and operation plan in an enforcement action, except for criminal or deliberate acts. The program depends on crews trusting that the data is not used to identify them.
The trap is to treat the two as separate worlds from the SMS. An unstable approach that appears in flight data, and the crew report describing the same approach, are one event seen from two sides. If they are counted twice, your occurrence rate is wrong. If they are never matched, you lose the context that makes the exceedance meaningful. And a serious exceedance with no report at all says something about your reporting culture that neither program shows alone.
So ask how a tool keeps the promises you signed. Flight data events should stay out of occurrence counts, crew identity should not be stored with them, and contact with a crew should run through the person your program names for it. Whatever your memorandum says about who sees an ASAP report governs the software, not the reverse.
04Requirements, and what to ask
Here is a working requirements table for a Part 121 regional. It is a sample to adapt, not an FAA form: the first two columns are the need and why it exists, the third is the question to put to any vendor, ideally live in a demo instead of in a questionnaire.
| Need | Why a regional needs it | What to ask a vendor |
|---|---|---|
| Confidential employee reporting | Part 5 requires a confidential reporting system. Crews, dispatchers, mechanics and station staff need one door that works on a ramp. | Who can see the name of a confidential reporter, on the record and in every export? Show a report filed from a phone with no signal. |
| Hazard register and risk assessment | Safety risk management: every hazard assessed, with the controls that hold it back. | Does the register arrive populated with aviation hazards and barriers, or blank? Can a risk score be saved with no written reason? |
| Corrective actions that close on evidence | Safety assurance: an action is verified, not ticked. | Try to close a record while its action is still open. What stops you? |
| Safety performance indicators | Performance monitoring, across a mixed fleet and many stations. | Who is told when an indicator crosses its alert level, and what must they record in reply? |
| Flight data and voluntary programs | FOQA exceedances and ASAP reports describe the same flights from two sides. | Are flight data events kept apart from occurrence counts? Is any crew identity stored? Who is allowed to contact a crew? |
| Partner and provider oversight | Codeshare partners above you, contracted providers below you, and hazard notification to interfacing persons. | Is each agreement a record with an owner and a review cycle? Can a provider be renewed with a finding still open? |
| Governance and accountability | The Safety Action Group and the Safety Review Board, and an accountable executive who signs. | Do items reach the agenda from live signals? Is each vote on the record? Who co-signs an accepted risk? |
| Evidence for the FAA and for partners | One chain from report to decision, retained for as long as Part 5 requires. | Pick one closed occurrence and export its whole chain. How long did that take? |
Two rows deserve more weight than they usually get. Partner and provider oversight is where the 2024 amendments added work, and it is the row a tool built for a single self-contained operator tends to miss. Evidence is the row both of your audiences test first, because an auditor opens by sampling one record and following it.
Our buyer's guide turns rows like these into procurement questions you can send as written.
05What a regional can skip
A thin team cannot afford a tool sized for someone else. Three things are worth declining.
- A second flight data analysis system. You already have a FOQA program and a tool that decodes the data. The SMS needs its exceedances, not a rival engine.
- A blank library. A register that ships empty asks a small department to author hazards, barriers and indicators before it can assess anything. That is months of writing with no safety value at the end of each week.
- Separate tools per program. A reporting app, a spreadsheet of partner audits and a slide deck for the board are three places for the chain to break. The value is in the links between records.
What you cannot skip, unlike a two-aircraft charter, is governance and oversight. A regional has a Safety Review Board that an accountable executive answers to and partners on both sides. A tool that stops at report, risk and action leaves the hardest part of your week in a spreadsheet.
06The test: one occurrence to the board
The quickest way to compare tools is to bring one real, de-identified occurrence and follow it. Use the same event with every vendor, and time each step.
- File it as a line employee would, from a phone, confidentially. Check who can see the reporter.
- Triage and classify it. See what the tool proposes and what a person has to decide.
- Score the risk. Try to save a severity and a probability with no written reason.
- Relate it to a hazard and to the barrier that was tested. Was the hazard already in the register?
- Match it to a flight data exceedance for the same flight, if your program produced one.
- Raise an action, then try to close the occurrence while the action is open.
- Take it to the board. Find the item on the Safety Action Group list, record a vote, escalate it to the Safety Review Board.
- Export the chain as you would hand it to your principal inspector or your codeshare partner.
In eAviora that path runs through flight data monitoring at step five and partner and provider oversight when the event involves a contractor. Where a step does not fit your procedure, you will see it in the demo, which is the point of running it on your own event.
Questions
No. 14 CFR Part 5 requires the Safety Management System, not a product. Part 121 carriers have been under Part 5 since the 2015 final rule, which required an SMS in place by March 9, 2018, and carriers that held an FAA-accepted SMS on May 28, 2024 had to revise it to the amended rule by May 28, 2025. What software changes is whether a small safety department can keep the records linked: the report, the hazard it shows, the risk assessment, the action and the board decision, in a chain that a principal inspector or a codeshare partner can follow without a week of assembly.
The final rule was published on April 26, 2024 and took effect on May 28, 2024. For a Part 121 carrier with an accepted SMS, 14 CFR 5.7(a) set May 28, 2025 as the date to revise the SMS to the amended part. Among the changes: the safety policy must include a code of ethics that applies to all employees, including management personnel and officers (5.21(a)(7)), and a carrier that identifies a hazard in its operating environment must notify any interfacing person who could address the hazard or mitigate the risk (5.57). Records of those notifications are retained for at least 24 consecutive calendar months (5.97(d)).
No. Both are voluntary FAA programs that feed an SMS and do not replace it. An Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) is entered into through a memorandum of understanding signed by the FAA, the certificate holder and, where applicable, the employee labor organization, and its reports are reviewed by an Event Review Committee. Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) is a voluntary flight data program described in Advisory Circular 120-82. Part 5 still requires the carrier to identify hazards, assess risk, monitor safety performance and act. The practical question is whether what ASAP and FOQA find reaches the same hazard register and the same indicators as everything else.
In both directions. A regional is usually the operating carrier under a capacity or codeshare agreement, so the mainline partner will ask for evidence that the SMS works: sampled occurrences, open actions, indicator trends. The regional in turn relies on its own providers (ground handling, contract maintenance, training), and since the 2024 amendments Part 5 requires it to notify interfacing persons of hazards they could address. Software should hold each agreement and each provider as a record with an owner, review cycles and findings, and should keep the notification itself as a retrievable record.
Three places worth knowing before a demo. First, eAviora is not a flight data analysis engine: it imports the exceedances your flight data program already exports, and does not decode recorder data. Second, risk is scored on the ICAO 5 by 5 matrix, the same for every operator, so a carrier whose manual defines a different matrix should raise that at the start. Third, the Event Review Committee process under your ASAP memorandum of understanding is yours and is not something we claim as a packaged workflow: walk us through it and judge the fit on your own procedure.